INTRODUCTION
This research is stimulated by the empirical observation that long-term inflation forecasts published by central banks which target inflation tend to be biased towards the target. To explain this we examine how the voting behaviour of members of a monetary policy committee (MPC) may influence its ability to targeting inflation. While the subject of the influence of decisions taken by the MPC on macroeconomic stability is well researched, relatively little is known about the effects of the intra-committee dynamics of MPC's on future inflation. It is hypothesized here that the manner in which MPC's make decisions, including individual preferences and interactions between MPC members, affect the decisions themselves and the subsequent outcomes. More precisely, the hypotheses are [1] bias might result from direct or indirect pressure from the leading members of the MPC on the forecasters, so that the longterm goals of the monetary policy appear to be feasible; [2] voting of the MPC members regarding policy decisions based on such biased forecasts might result in undertaking unnecessarily active decisions, which in turn lead to an increased volatility and persistence of inflation. Additionally, we aim to further the findings of Fritsche et al. (2015) and Fildes (2015) , that organisational and psychological factors affect the rationality of forecasters' behaviour, by explaining the possible outcomes of such behaviour.
The effect of MPC's decisions on macroeconomic stability has been widely analysed in the literature. Earlier research has looked at the preferences of committees with regards to inflation and output gaps e.g. Rogoff (1985) , Waller (1989) and Mihov and Sibert (2006) , along with the optimal rules to follow to ensure stability and growth, e.g. Rudebusch (2001) and Clarida et al. (2000) and how action are interpreted by the private sector e.g. (Demertzis and Hughes Hallett, 2008) . This literature, however, has not usually considered the process by which the monetary decision is made. A smaller body of work has shown that the dynamics of group interactions 2 within MPC's have a significant effect on their ability (e.g. Blinder and Morgan, 2005) . These papers, examining heterogeneous voting behaviour under specific voting schemes, have principally been concerned with the real policy effects (Gerlach-Kristen, 2006) , informational efficiency (Blinder, 2007) , or game-theoretical equilibrium Bierut, 2005a,b, 2010) .
The structure and heterogeneity of signals considered by the MPC members in their voting decision, however, has rarely been discussed. The relevant papers looking at this aspect of the problem are that of Gerlach-Kristen (2006) and Weber (2010) , who both analyse the effect of different gap signals on voting (see also Blinder, 2007) , Brooks et al. (2007) , where dynamic behaviour of the MPC voters is considered, and Gerlach-Kirsten (2004 , Horváth et al. (2010) and Sirchenko (2011) , who use records of MPC voting to predict interest rate changes.
We focus here on the effect of the MPC on inflation; however, historically central banks have also targeted exchange rates with varying degrees of success (Brandner et al. 2006) . If these interventions are decided by committee they may be subject to the same types of biases we analyse here.
As in Weber (2010) we are assuming heterogeneity of the MPC members with respect to the signals they received. However, we concentrate on the heterogeneity of the inflationary rather than output gap signals. We follow Blinder's (2007) suggestion and consider the static and dynamic effects of such heterogeneity on MPC monetary decisions and, subsequently, on inflation. More precisely, this paper concentrates on those aspects of MPC voting behaviour which are related to the perception and manipulation of the inflation forecasts signals. We investigate the effect of bias resulting from alteration of the forecast signals before they reach the majority of the voters (for a different view on leaders' bias of the voting scheme see Chappell et. al, 2007) . In many cases the experts who produce the forecasts for the MPC work under some institutional influence of the MPC members, e.g. they might be employed by the Central Bank and be subordinates of the chair of the MPC (who is often a Governor of the 3 Bank). As such it is possible for some members of the MPC to pressurise experts in such a way that they would produce forecasts which would suit the preferences of some members of the MPC more than the others. This would create a certain bias affecting voting outcome and, consequently, future monetary policy and inflation.
We examine the nature and outcomes of this potential bias using an inter-temporal model of
voting. An evident difficulty in such research is the lack of data. Empirical information on individual votes are sometimes available and used for establishing relationships between voting and outcome; see e.g Chappell et al. 2005 and Brooks et al., 2007) . There is, quite understandably, no direct evidence of inflation signal manipulation. Nevertheless, some indirect empirical evidence has been found and is discussed in Section 2. Another difficulty is that analytical solutions in a fully stochastic and intertemporal context are intractable (see Section 4 of this paper). In the light of these, we resort to setting up an inter-temporal simulation model.
In this model decisions undertaken by the MPC directly affect next-period inflation. The crucial aspect of the model is the ability of one member of the committee to alter the inflation forecast signals delivered to the others (see Section 3). We assume that the most influential member of the committee has the power to alter the signals which other members of the committee receive.
An alternative description of this behaviour could be that the most dominant member influences more junior members' perception of an accurate signal. Regardless of whether this comes through force of argument, seniority, or institutional rules, the dominant member may persuade others to vote in a particular manner even when their individual interpretation of the signal would entail a different action. In this setting Sibert (2003) shows that if more weight is placed on the decisions of senior policy makers the change in expected social welfare is ambiguous.
The results presented in this paper may also be interpreted in the light of this setting and demonstrate that bias towards one particular policy maker has a specific effect on the ability to meet inflation targets.
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The general model setting differs markedly from those usually applied in the contemporary theory of voting and aggregation rules. The initial assumptions are simple: the MPC members are sincere (naïve) voters, refraining from strategic voting. Only under the extreme assumption of independence of voting decisions and identical (for all voters) probabilities of taking the correct decision, together with particular voting scheme designs, can the voting process be regarded as optimal in the Condorcet sense (that is that sincere democratic majority voting on a limited number of alternatives is socially superior in relation to other alternatives; see e.g.
Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996 , Ladha, 1992 , Chwe, 2010 . Our work also relates to that of Dietrich and List (2004) who present a model in which jurors make decision based on a common body of evidence rather than the state of the world. It was shown in this paper that in the limit the probability of a correct decision converges to the probability of the evidence not being misleading. The model presented in this paper sits between these two views. Whilst our committee members receive information on a body of evidence rather than the state of the world, that body of evidence is not common. In fact the information reaching particular MPC members are partially stochastic, hence different and, in the general case, correlated. Nitzan and Paroush (1984) consider interdependent voting and find that it is inferior to independent voting. In contrast Estlund (1994) finds that in some circumstances voters may follow opinion leaders and increase overall competence.
The problem of setting the optimal voting rules is not considered here (as it is not considered in the realities of central banks), rather we focus on the efficiency of voting under the aggregation rules frequently used by central bankers. In this perspective the paper extends the currently used framework of voting analysis by adding an intertemporal dimension and allowing for a stochastic rather than deterministic 'state of the world'.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents motivation to our study by analysing the empirical distributions of inflation forecasts produced in central banks and the corresponding 5 realisations. We find that the forecasts exhibit significant bias caused by the presence of inflation target barriers, potentially resulting from forecast manipulation. Section 3 presents the details of the model. Section 4 contains the main distributional results and Section 5 the intertemporal simulation results. In Section 6 the assumption of sincere voting is relaxed by introducing strategic behaviour based on a Bayesian learning rule. Conclusions call for the independence of the inflation forecasting units from the Central Bank and more heterogeneity, both in terms of greater diversification of the MPC members and a larger variety of forecast information.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
We consider the official central banks' inflation forecasts in terms of their distribution, and compare it to the distribution of the realisations, that is, of the observed headline inflation. In practice, inflation forecasts made by central banks might be of two kinds. Forecasts of the first kind are designed to provide information to the decision-makers regarding the most probable path of inflation; their aim being to highlight possible deviations from inflation target so that appropriate action can be taken. Forecasts of the second kind show the most probable paths of inflation development after the MPC makes its decision. These forecasts are also of use to the practitioners outside the central bank, helping them in strategic and investment decisions, etc..
Forecasts of the first kind, called herein early forecasts, are made before the monetary policy decision is undertaken. These forecasts should be unbiased, and institutionally neutral, as their aim is to provide the best possible information to the central bank decision makers.
We analyse data on early forecasts from 10 central banks of countries undertaking inflation targeting: Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Korea, New Zealand, Mexico, Norway, Poland and Sweden. These countries are those for which (a) data on forecasts and corresponding realisations are available and (b) it is possible to identify early forecasts which are produced by some sort of research departments and delivered to the board prior to the meetings. On these 6 grounds we have excluded the UK, as the forecasts are actually made by the committee itself and not by the research department (adding the UK does not change the outcome markedly, these results are available on request). We do, however, include countries in which central banks' target core rather than headline inflation, as the concept of headline inflation is better understood by the recipients of monetary policy and there is usually a negligible difference in long-term forecasts of both. We consider point ( In other words, while there is no tendency for the forecasters to bias forecasts for the horizons of 1-6 months (results not reported here) it is evident that the majority of the central bankers'
inflation forecasts convey a message that 'inflation will be under control after 12, or at most after 24, months'. The reality shows that this was not often the case. This was not caused by the effect that the inflation forecasts had on setting the targets, as usually the target has been changed very infrequently (in most cases not at all) during the period under research. It suggests that if targets have not been bent towards the forecasts, then the forecasts could be bent towards the targets. In other words, the objective of the forecasters may be to satisfy the expectations of the policy makers rather than delivering unbiased forecast.
However, the above conclusion can be blurred to an extent by the fact that outside forecasts (that is, made by the institutions or individuals which are not dependents of the central banks)
might be similarly biased, due to the strong belief in the efficiency of monetary policy, if the reputation of the central bank is strong. Using the terminology introduced by Frenkel, Rülke and Zimmerman (2013) , they might either chase after the central banks' forecasts, or intentionally stray away; see also Rülke, Silgoner and Wörz, (2016) . Burda et al. (2014) failed to find statistically significant support either for such chasing or straying in the case of CPI inflation, however, Pedersen (2015) found evidence of chasing, for short-term forecasts and for the central bank forecasts of Chile. If the chasing explanation were the case, the test results for the forecasts made by the outside forecasters could be similar to those given in Table 1 .
Consequently the conclusions given above would be unfounded, as it would be difficult to tell the institutional bias from reputational bias. To control for this we have additionally computed test statistics analogous to that given in Table 1 to compare the distributions of bank-produced and externally-produced forecasts. 2 Data for the externally produced forecast came from the CESifo World Economic Survey, which gives up to one-year ahead inflation forecast made by panels of professional forecasters for a group of countries which includes the 10 countries analysed here over the same period (see Wieland, 2014 , and, for the description of the 10 methodology, Stangl, 2007) . These data have then been paired with the corresponding banks'
forecasts, giving 123 pairs in total. Table 2 are not fully conclusive. However, they weakly support our conjecture that the distributions of inflation forecasts produced by central banks and those produced outside, are different, and that the banks' forecasts tend to be within the target bands more often than the external forecasts. This is particularly evident by comparing the frequencies of forecasts being outside the target zone (20% for the banks' forecasts opposite 29% for the external forecasts). Also, the McNemar statistic is significant at 5%, confirming non-homogeneity, and the McCulloch-Pitman-Morgan statistic, although non-significant at conventional significance levels, is not high. The Pitman-Morgan type tests usually have a relatively low power, so that rejections of a false null are infrequent (see e.g. Wilcox, 1990) . Moreover, the CESifo forecasts are in practice for horizons shorter than one year, which likely creates the bias towards the null hypothesis, as the forecast dispersion usually increases with the forecasting horizon. From this we may conclude that the comparison of the banks' forecasts with the external forecasts at a minimum does not contradict our conjecture of the institutional bias, and, most likely, strengthens it.
Results in
In the subsequent sections of the paper we aim to explain this phenomenon by setting up a simulation model which explains the effects of possible institutional influence on voting over monetary policy and, subsequently, on the distribution of inflation. We show that the biased voting can actually increase the volatility of inflation and contribute positively to the observed non-homogeneity of central banks' forecasts and realisations.
MODEL

Assumptions
We consider the voting behaviour of a monetary policy committee with n members over time t = 1,2,…,T. In each period the MPC votes on monetary policy which affects inflation in time t+1. We model simple majority voting, with three possible outcomes: an active anti-inflationary decision, an active pro-inflationary decision and no change. Details of alternative voting schemes, are described in Appendix.
Adopting the Geraats (2009) model for the case of heterogeneous voters (for heterogeneity of the MPC voters' preferences, see Faust, 1996) , each MPC member, indexed by i, i = 1,…,n, maximises, at time t, the expected value of his/her objective function:
where ωi is the weight given to the inflationary target by individual MPC members (assumed to be constant over time), πt is inflation in time t, yt is output and π T , y T are respectively the inflation and output point targets.
Following Geraats (2009), the economy is described by a simple model:
Aggregate demand:
12 Phillips curve:
where information on the demand curve is identical for all MPC members, rt is the riskless one- 
 for all i and all t, it may be shown that the first-order condition for the i th MPC member, after substituting (2)and (3) into (1) and taking expectations, gives:
where , it r is the interest rate fulfilling the first-order condition, that is, maximizing the utility function subject to inflation signals ,1 f it   received by each MPC member. Similar results may be obtained using a variety of models and assuming heterogeneity of MPC members (see e.g. Woodford, 2003, pp. 246; Besley et al., 2008, Eijffinger and Tesfaselassie, 2006) . The inflation signal given to member i at time t, ,1 f it   , is a random variable. Although the official forecasts delivered to all MPC members are identical, we treat the future inflation signals as heterogeneous but correlated. If the MPC members were to rely solely on the official forecast, these forecasts would be perfectly correlated among themselves. We are assuming, however, that each individual forecast is in fact a combination of the official forecast and some other information available (unofficial forecast or personal research) leading to correlated signals.
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We consider here the simplest case of the linear correlation across voters as being constant.
Whilst the conditions for this are stringent we focus on this as the most intuitive case.
3
The voting rule applied here is: As voters are sincere, in the sense that their decisions are based (5) alone, the applied voting scheme would be optimal in the Condorcet (1785) sense (for reviews of contemporary description and generalisations see e.g. Young, 1995 , Gerling et al., 2005 
Implementation
In our stylized model, the MPC decision alters the inflation distribution at time t+1 by affecting its mean. No other factors alter the distribution of inflation. In other words, if the MPC takes 14 no action, the inflation distribution remains unchanged. More generally, the relation between the distribution of inflation at time t and the initial distribution of inflation, 0  , is: As in reality at most central banks we consider the MPC to request forecasts which are made under the assumption that the next monetary decision will be passive; otherwise it would be required that the forecasters double-guess the policy makers. This is similar in spirit to the Sender-Receiver model by Crawford and Sobel (1982) . This implies that the initial forecast signals provided by the experts (which, as it is assumed later, are not necessarily the signals delivered to all MPC members), denoted by ,1
f it   , are drawn from:
This forecasting scheme is dubbed 'perfect', in the distributional sense, as the forecasters perfectly recognize the distribution of inflation (on the foundations of relations between the forecasters and monetary policy makers see Dow, 2004 ). This assumption is most conducive to the forecasters. If it is changed in such a way that forecasts are distributionally imperfect, e.g.
variance of the distribution of ,1 f it   is either smaller of larger than variance of 1 t   , this would create bias which would affect identification of the policy effects.
First Receiver
One particular MPC member, is the first to receive the inflation forecast signal provided by the experts and generated as a realisation of the random variable. 
where β is the strength of the mean alteration by the FR, assumed here to be identical for all i.
Hence, if , | | 1 nt v  , the FR alters the mean of the signal delivered to the other MPC members in such a way that it inflates the inflation signal by β when he/she wants to vote for an antiinflationary measure and deflates the inflation signal by β in the opposite case. Otherwise the signal is passed on unaltered.
This type of behaviour has been observed in MPC's, for instance Alan Greenspan would, on occasion, use his power over other members to change their voting behaviour (Blinder, 2007) .
If neither the thresholds nor weights can be affected, as both of these are characteristics of the individual committee members, the only remaining action for the FR is to alter the value of the inflation signal. In practice this is possible when the signal comes from a research division of a central bank which is subordinated, either formally or informally, to the FR. Alternatively, as was discussed in the introduction, the FR could affect the interpretation of the signal by more junior members of the committee, either through seniority or persuasive argument. The FR alters the forecast signal as:
, 1 , ,1 
e j t n t gv   are discussed in the next section of the paper.
DECISIONS AND OUTCOMES
Static Analysis
In order to avoid blurring the results by changes to less relevant parameters the remaining parameters are kept constant. These are:  The distribution of inflation is skewed normal rather than normal.
 Different voting schemes other than the three-way voting.
 The deviation of the output gap from the target is not zero.
 A nonstationary (random walk) inflation process.
 The FR is not the most active MPC member, that is his/her i  in (4) is not the highest.
In all cases these generalisations do not change the results in a significant way. If the assumptions are generalised (which, in the context of a simulation model, is technically straightforward), the model becomes more realistic, but the causal relations less visible.
Dynamic analysis
This   , will result in a decrease in the inflation targeting efficiency in the sense that the probability of hitting the inflation target is diminished. This is seen in Figure 4b , in both cases the RDT is markedly above one, indicating a loss in efficiency in relation to the case where no decision is made.
However, in the case where there is signal alteration the RDT is markedly higher. This inefficiency comes from a higher standard deviation of inflation. Recall that the standard deviation of the inflation distribution under no decisions is 1. Figure 4a shows that in both voting cases, although notably more for the altered signal, the inflation dispersion is greater than the initial unitary dispersion, i.e. voting makes inflation variation greater leading to less efficiency.
Further analysis suggests there may be some degree of persistence explained by time delays in taking the inflation process back towards the inflation target zone after a disturbance. 
LEARNING
In previous sections we have assumed that all voters behave sincerely, that is they base their votes solely on the information received, as incorporated in their decision functions. We have assumed so far that voters other than the FR do not actively oppose or adapt their behaviour to possible FR's manipulation and that they are fully convinced by the forecast signals received.
In reality, however, committee members may have incentives to modify their behaviour according to their beliefs regarding the sincerity of the FR actions. In this section we consider a mechanism by which they could do this. Individuals may learn from previous 'suspicious' behaviour of the FR. They may treat inflation forecasts from the FR with a degree of scepticism, changing the degree to which they respond to these signals. 
Bayes n t n t i t n t n t i t n t vv
Under (9) it is possible for the i th MPC member to make a mistake by wrongly correcting previous unaltered forecast as finding that ,, { 0} Bayes n t n t dv  does not necessarily mean that signal alteration really took place.
The effect of learning on the probability of reaching the inflation targets is illustrated in Figure   7 . It shows the ratios of average RDT's, where the numerator is the average RDT of the model without learning and the denominator is an analogous average RDT's for a model with learning.
As the RDT shows losses in efficiency due to signal alterations, the ratio can be interpreted as The RDT ratios in Figure 7 are always greater than one, which illustrates that learning provides a strong countermeasure to signal alteration despite the fact that individual decisions can sometimes be wrong (that is, voters might think that the FR has altered the signal, when in fact such action has not taken place). Dependence on correlation and time is evident here. Bayesian learning is more efficient with longer time horizons (more time to learn) and is also more efficient when inflation signals are more heterogeneous. Clearly the time dependence is nonlinear here, with gains rising more quickly with the increase in time horizons for shorter rather than longer periods of time.
CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this paper explain the observed bias of central banks' inflation forecasts towards targets. The paper provides empirical evidence of anti-herding behaviour of the MPC forecasters (in relation to independent forecasters), confirming indirectly the earlier findings of Fritsche et. al (2015) and Rülke, Silgoner and Wörz (2016) . In this spirit the paper explains behaviour through the organisational structure of a hypothetical monetary policy council. It 30 finds that if a particular member of a MPC is in position to alter inflation forecast signals delivered to the rest of the committee, it may negatively affect the ability of the committee to meet an inflationary target. This is the case even if alteration is well-motivated, that it, aimed at achieving an inflationary target. Negative effects of signal alteration are evident when the inflation distribution is in fact on (or close to) the target in terms of it mean. In this case any active voting can be damaging so that, if signal alteration increases the possibility of such In practice signal alterations can be made either by the Governor of the Bank, the head of its forecasting (research) division, or a person who has particularly strong institutional or psychological influence on the forecasters. The simplest practical solution here would be to separate the process of forecasting from the Bank and put it in the hands of an independent organisation such as a university or a consulting firm. As heterogeneity of forecasting signals plays an important, positive, role in increasing efficiency, it is relevant to diversify such signals and gain forecast information from as many independent sources as feasible. Presumably a better, albeit more costly, way out of the problem, could be to create a designated separate unit 5. 'Bank of Poland' voting. This is an absolute majority voting scheme such that the voters first vote for the 1  motion, with the Chairman having the casting vote. If there is no absolute majority (or if, in case of a tie, the motion is not supported by the Chairman), there is another vote for the 1    motion. If this vote is not decisive, again considering the casting vote of the Chairman, the result is 0  . Assuming that there is no change in voting intensions between two rounds of voting, the scheme is: 
